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Marco Ventoruzzo*
ISSUING NEW SHARES AND PREEMPTIVE RIGHTS:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
1. Introduction
The question of whether the corporate laws of Europe and
America are converging is still largely unanswered.' One fundamen-
tal area in which the two systems diverge concerns how they regulate
the issuing of new shares, in particular preemptive rights-a problem
rarely addressed by comparative corporate law scholars.2 This essay
fills that gap by examining the major comparative differences between
the approaches followed on the two sides of the Atlantic and offers
some possible explanations for this divergence.
The issuing of new shares by a corporation is often a recipe for
litigation. In fact, when new shares are issued and not offered to ex-
isting shareholders, shareholders may suffer two types of damages.
On the one hand, shareholders' voting power within the corporation is
diluted. On the other hand, the value of their investment can be re-
duced if the selling price is lower than the actual value of the shares.
Consider the following scenario. Corporation XYZ, worth four
million dollars, has 1,000 shares outstanding. Shareholder A owns
25% of the shares (250 shares). A controls one-fourth of the voting
power, and the value of her investment is one million dollars. If the
corporation issues 1,000 new shares and sells them to a third party,
A's voting power is reduced to 12.5% (250 shares over 2,000 outstand-
ing). Depending on the price at which the new shares are offered, the
value of A's investment could also be jeopardized. If XYZ sells the new
shares at $4,000 each (the value before the new issue), no damage is
caused. In fact, A will still own 12.5% of a corporation worth eight
million dollars, which equals one million dollars. If, however, XYZ
* Professor of Law, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy, and Penn State Dickinson
School of Law; State College, PA, USA; External Scientific Member, Max Planck
Institute Luxembourg. I wish to thank Catherine Rogers for her precious sugges-
tions. Excellent research assistance was provided by Elizabeth Robinson.
1 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERsiTY (Joseph A.
McCahery et al. eds., 1st ed. 2002); Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Gov-
ernance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 329 (2001); Douglas
M. Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect of "Global" Convergence in Corporate
Governance, 34 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 321 (2001).
2 REINER R. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 192 (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed. 2009) (giving a
brief comparative overview of the regulation of share issuance).
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sells the shares at a "discount," the value of A's investment will be
proportionally reduced. If, for example, the new 1,000 shares are sold
for $3,000 each, the value of A's stake in the corporation will decrease
to $875,000 (12.5% * $7,000,000).
Of course the law could dramatically curb this risk by provid-
ing that all existing shareholders always have a mandatory preemp-
tive right to buy newly issued shares. Similar protections, however,
would be detrimental to the corporation. It is essential that directors
retain a certain degree of flexibility in designing the financial struc-
ture of the corporation. Granting preemptive rights to shareholders is
time-consuming because the shares must be first offered to existing
stockholders and might hinder the ability of the corporation to quickly
obtain fresh financial resources when market conditions are favorable.
The law must therefore strike a delicate balance between the protec-
tion of existing shareholders, on the one hand, and the ability of the
corporation to pursue its optimal financial structure, on the other.
There are three basic sets of rules that contribute to strike
such a balance: rules concerning the allocation of powers between di-
rectors and shareholders to decide on the issuing of new shares, pre-
emptive rights in case new shares are sold, and fiduciary duties of
directors engaging in the sale of new shares. The purpose of this essay
is to consider how different legal systems strike this balance in regu-
lating the issuance of new shares, focusing in particular on preemptive
rights. The comparison is not only important for the relevance of the
problem, but also because it illuminates some of the fundamental dif-
ferences in the corporate governance philosophies underlying different
legal systems.
This essay compares the systems in the U.S. and continental
European jurisdictions with particular reference to Italy. Focusing on
these systems is particularly apt because the two models follow nearly
opposite approaches. In the U.S., directors enjoy broad powers in the
issuing of new shares, and there is greater freedom of contract in regu-
lating preemptive rights in the corporate charter. Under this system,
shareholders are mainly protected through directors' fiduciary duties.
In Europe, shareholders are protected through statutory rules that
mandate preemptive rights. Shareholders have the power to waive
preemptive rights, but only in limited circumstances.
One might argue that European systems still follow the ap-
proach adopted in the U.S. until roughly the 1960s, and a possible ex-
planation is that Europe did not experience the same separation
between ownership and control that occurred in the U.S. The compari-
son will allow exploration of a more general difference between share-
holder protection in the U.S. and in the civil law systems of continental
Europe, namely, the fact that the former jurisdiction relies more on ex-
post litigation, and the latter on ex-ante mandatory rules.
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Part I analyzes the American regulation of the issuing of new
shares. Part II turns to its European counterpart, with a focus on the
Italian system. Part III concludes by pointing out the differences in
approaches to this crucial legal issue.
PART I: U.S. LAW
1. Competence to Issue New Shares
In the U.S., the power to issue new shares is primarily en-
trusted to the board of directors. Directors enjoy a great degree of free-
dom in issuing new shares; however one important limitation is that
they can only issue the number of shares authorized by the articles of
incorporation. Generally, corporations have outstanding shares,
which are shares already sold to shareholders that form the capital of
the corporation; but the articles of incorporation provide for additional
authorized shares that directors can issue and sell.' For example, a
corporation can have 100 outstanding shares held by two sharehold-
ers, but the articles of incorporation can authorize the issuing of an
additional 200 shares. If directors want to issue more than the addi-
tional 200 shares, they need to obtain shareholders' approval to in-
crease the number of the authorized shares.
This rule gives shareholders some control over the financial
structure of the corporation. Sales of shares that might dilute share-
holders' ownership of the corporation above the threshold set by the
authorized shares must be voted by shareholders as an amendment to
the articles of incorporation.s The practice, however, is to provide for a
number of authorized shares significantly larger than the number of
outstanding shares, so that if new financial resources are needed, di-
rectors can easily issue new shares. In contrast to European law, issu-
ing new shares in the U.S. is substantially and practically in the hands
of directors.' In addition, minority shareholders in corporations with a
controlling shareholder derive little protection from this rule because
majority shareholders can consent to increase the number of author-
ized shares.
3 See ANDREAS CAHN & DAVID C. DONALD, COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW 205 (Cam-
bridge University Press, 2010) (stating that, in Delaware "[w]ithin the limits of the
authorized stock, the board of directors is free to issue stock on its own authority
until all the authorized stock has been issued. Delaware law thus places consider-
ably more power in the hands of the board than either Germany or the United
Kingdom.").
4 See generally MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 6.01, 6.02 (2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 161 (2010).
5 See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 135 (West, 2000); see also Mira
Ganor, The Power to Issue Stock, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 701, 709 (2011).
6 See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141, 161.
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One exception to this allocation of powers is established by
M.B.C.A. § 6.21(f), which requires shareholders' approval if (i) the
shares are issued for consideration other than cash, and (ii) the voting
power of shares that are issued comprises more than 20 percent of the
voting power of the outstanding shares.' Also in listed corporations,
shareholders' approval is necessary when the issuing of new shares
might determine a shift in control. Rules enacted by the NYSE, the
NASD, and the American Stock Exchange require a vote at the share-
holders' meeting when a listed corporation issues an amount of new
common shares exceeding 20% of the outstanding ones, if the issuance
is not made through a public offer for cash.'
2. Preemptive Rights
Another way to protect shareholders in the event new shares
are issued is to grant them a preemptive right to purchase these
shares.' In this case, shareholders who want to avoid the dilution of
their participation can acquire pro-rata the new shares paying the re-
quired consideration.o Of course, this protection is effective only to
the extent that shareholders have the financial means and the willing-
ness to buy the new shares but if they do, no dilution will occur.
The traditional approach in the U.S. was that shareholders en-
joyed preemptive rights." This was the rule followed at common law.
Probably the first case to enunciate preemptive rights was Gray v.
Portland Bank, a Massachusetts case decided in 1807.12 The first gen-
eral corporation statutes followed this judicial doctrine and granted
preemptive rights to shareholders. Massachusetts is an interesting
example, as chapter 179 of the Acts of 1870 provided that whenever a
corporation increased its capital stock, it was required to give notice to
each shareholder, and the shareholders were able to buy the new
shares pro-rata at their par value." Interestingly, and in contrast to
what is provided in other legal systems, shareholders were only enti-
tled to a pro-rata preemptive right: if some shares remained unsold,
the directors could sell them on the market. However, any premium
(the difference between the par value and the selling price) had to be
7 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAw 39 (Foundation Press, 2nd ed. 2009).
8 KRAAKMAN, supra note 2, at 194.
9 See Ganor, supra note 5, at 706.
10 Id.
11 See GEVURTZ, supra note 5, at 136 n. 61 (citing Stokes v. Cont'l Trust Co., 78
N.E. 1090 (N.Y. 1906), which provides an illustration of the traditional approach
in the U.S.).
12 See Andrew L. Nichols, Shareholder Preemptive Rights, 39 Bos. BAR J. 4, 4
(1995) (citing Gray v. Portland Bank, 3 Mass. 363 (1807)).
13 See id.
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paid to the shareholders that had not exercised their preemptive right
in proportion to their shares. 14
Preemptive rights might, however, interfere with the ability of
the corporation to raise new funds, if nothing else because the need to
give some time to existing shareholders to exercise their right slows
down the sale of the new shares. Some early amendments to general
corporation statutes simply provided that shareholders could deter-
mine the terms and manners of the disposition of newly issued shares,
meaning that they could limit or exclude preemptive rights. This was
the case, for example, with the 1903 Acts of Massachusetts."
More modern corporate statutes abandon this approach and
generally deny preemptive rights unless the governing documents of
the corporation opt for them. The default rule is that shareholders do
not have a preemptive right in case of issuance of new shares, unless
the articles of incorporation (or sometimes, the bylaws) expressly pro-
vide so."6 In Massachusetts this rule was adopted in 1964, under
chapter 156B, section 20 of the general corporation statute.' 7 The
M.B.C.A. and Delaware law also provide for similar rules.18
Notably, there are some differences in how preemptive rights
are structured. Some statutes allow shareholders to opt-in to preemp-
tive rights, both in the charter and in the bylaws of the corporation.
The effect is obviously different, because if the rule is in the charter,
shareholders' approval is necessary to amend it, while if it is in the
bylaws, directors could be able to amend it without shareholders' con-
sent. It follows that shareholders' rights are more protected if the pre-
emptive rights are set forth in the articles of incorporation.19
Alternatively, a different approach followed by a minority of
corporate statutes provides an opt-out mechanism for some corpora-
tions. Under this regime, shareholders enjoy preemptive rights as a
default rule, but the articles of incorporation can waive them.2 0
14 See id.
15 See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Statutory Developments in Business Corporation Law,
1886-1936, 50 HARv. L. REV. 27, 37 (1936) (outlining the provisions of Mass. Acts
& Resolves 1903, c. 437).
16 See GEVURTZ, supra note 5, at 136 n. 63.
17 See MAsS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156B § 20 (1964).
18 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 6.30 (2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(3) (2012).
19 More precisely, in some jurisdictions shareholders can prevent the risk that di-
rectors will amend a bylaws rule introduced by them by explicitly providing that
directors do not have this power. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 10.20 (b). There are
more doubts that this is possible under Delaware law. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note
7, at 16.
20 GEVURTZ, supra note 5, at 136 n. 6 (citing N.Y. Bus. CORP. § 622 (providing a
similar rule for corporations formed before 1997).
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Whether shareholders can individually negotiate for preemp-
tive rights in a separate contract with the corporation presents an in-
teresting interpretive question. If this is not possible, the only way to
grant preemptive rights would be to include them in the governing
documents of the corporation. If individually negotiated rights are per-
missible, however, it would be possible that only some shareholders
would enjoy preemptive rights. If such agreements are not permitted,
all shareholders in a similar situation would be able to exercise pre-
emptive rights. The language of most statutes raises this ambiguity;
for example, section 102(b)(3) of the Delaware General Corporation
Law provides, in relevant part, that: "No stockholder shall have any
preemptive right to subscribe to an additional issue of stock or to any
security convertible into such stock unless, and except to the extent
that, such right is expressly granted to him in the certificate of
incorporation."2 1
There are two possible readings of such a provision. On the one
hand, it can be interpreted as simply repealing the previous rule ac-
cording to which shareholders had, as a general matter, preemptive
rights, and stating how general preemptive rights can be established.
If this interpretation is adopted, the statute does not prohibit share-
holders from entering into a separate contract with the corporation to
enjoy preemptive rights. The statutory provision could, however, also
be given a broader meaning. Under this reading, the only way to grant
preemptive rights is to include them in the charter and, therefore,
make them available to all shareholders. The first interpretation is
preferable, and it seems supported by the limited authority existing on
the point.2 2
Even when the articles of incorporation provide for preemptive
rights, several delicate problems can arise, especially when the corpo-
rate contract does not regulate all the situations that can arise in the
life of a corporation. The most important of these questions are dis-
cussed below.
3. Interpretation Questions on the Applicability of Preemptive
Rights
The first issue concerns the possibility for existing sharehold-
ers to exercise their preemptive rights only pro-rata. Imagine, for ex-
ample, that a corporation has issued 200 shares, and that its two
shareholders own 100 shares each. If the corporation issues 100 new
shares and only one shareholder exercises her pre-emptive right, she
would be allowed to buy 50 shares in order to maintain her 50% stake
21 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 102(b)(3).
22 See Nichols supra note 12, at 26 (citing Garza v. T.V. Answer, Inc., Civ. A. No.
12784, 1993 WL 77186 (Del. Ch., March 15, 1993)).
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in the corporation. In this scenario, can she also exercise her preemp-
tive right on the remaining 50 shares that the other shareholder de-
cided not to buy, or can these shares be freely sold to third parties by
the directors? The existing shareholders might have an interest to pre-
vent new investors from becoming shareholders, something that, espe-
cially in a close corporation, can be highly desirable. The answer
depends on how the preemptive right clause is written in the charter,
and the scope of the preemptive right is something that the drafters of
the articles of incorporation should take into careful account. However,
it is worth noting that even old corporate law statutes that provided
for preemptive rights limited these rights to a pro-rata percentage of
the newly issued shares.
Another important problem can occur when the corporation
wants to issue new shares for a consideration in kind, such as property
or services. If the corporation is issuing new shares for cash, the exer-
cise of a preemptive right set forth in the articles of incorporation is
simple: since cash is fungible, shareholders will pay the price set for
the shares and acquire the new securities issued. However, when the
corporation wants to obtain property, such as the assets of another cor-
poration, real estate from a third party, or services from a specific indi-
vidual or business, shareholders simply cannot offer to the corporation
the same consideration that it is seeking to obtain. In this case, there-
fore, courts tend not to apply preemptive rights, unless the articles of
incorporation explicitly state so.23 This solution is adopted also by the
M.B.C.A. § 6.30(b)(3)(iv). 2 4
The issue arose in a 1930 Maryland case, Thom v. Baltimore
Trust Co.25 The Baltimore Trust intended to issue new shares in ex-
change for the shares of National Union Bank of Maryland. Two-thirds
of the shareholders of the former company approved the plan, which
required Baltimore Trust to issue 15,000 shares at a price of $112 per
share, for the purpose of acquiring 10,000 shares of National Union
Bank at a valuation of $168 per share.2 6 The increase of the capital of
Baltimore Trust was approved as a charter amendment, but a contem-
poraneous amendment introduced a preemptive right in case new
shares were issued, also providing, however, that the directors could
issue stock without preferential subscription rights in order to accom-
plish a merger or acquisition.2 7 The Court of Appeals of Maryland rea-
soned that the charter provision complied with the then-established
23 See generally Thom v. Baltimore Trust Co., 148 A. 234 (Md. 1930).
24 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 6.30(b)(3)(iv).
25 Thom, 148 A. at 234.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 235.
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doctrine of preemptive right, and it legitimately excluded preemptive
rights when new shares were issued for property.2 8
A somewhat similar situation might occur when a corporation
wants to issue new shares as part of a compensation scheme for its
employees and officers. Do preemptive rights also apply to these
transactions? In this case, the corporation has an interest in ensuring
that the new shares are attributed to the employees. The M.B.C.A.
provides that, in the absence of an explicit provision to the contrary in
the charter, no preemptive rights apply when new shares are issued as
compensation to directors, officers, and employees of the corporation.2 9
Another important exception to the preemptive rights rule con-
cerns mergers. Similar to what happens in case of a contribution in
kind, in a merger the assets of the merged corporation are transferred
to the acquiring corporation, which issues new shares that will be
given to the shareholders of the merged corporation according to an
exchange ratio.3 0 If the shareholders of the buyer could exercise their
preemptive rights, a stock-for-stock merger would not be possible. Un-
less expressly provided in the governing documents of the corporation,
courts tend to exclude preemptive rights in case of merger. Also in this
context, the interest of the corporation to accomplish the merger is
considered superior to the shareholders' interest in maintaining their
stake in the corporation. In addition, shareholders are protected by
appraisal rights for dissenting shareholders" and, as will be discussed
below, by fiduciary duties of directors. Directors engaging in an unfair
merger, in which the exchange ratio does not accurately reflect the
value of the two merging corporations, can be liable for breach of their
duty of care or of loyalty.3 2
To sum up, there are situations in which, even if a general pre-
emptive right is included in the governing documents of the corpora-
tion, courts could deny the right after weighing the interests of the
corporation and of the shareholders. Three of the most important cases
have been mentioned above: when the corporation is issuing new
shares for property or services, as compensation to employees, and in
the case of a merger. In all of these situations, granting the exercise of
preemptive rights can adversely affect the corporation, which might
not be able to pursue its goals. Following the same rationale as the
28 Id. at 236.
29 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 6.30(b)(3).
so See generally Frederic A. Bittner, Capital Stock-Corporations-Members and
Stockholders-A Minority Shareholder Has a Primary Cause of Action for Denial of
Preemptive Rights in a Corporate Merger, 42 TEx. L. REV. 908 (1964).
31 One of the best analyses of the role and regulation of appraisal rights in the
United States can be found in Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority
Rule: Appraisal's Role in Corporate Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1, 15 (1995).
32 See GEVURTZ, supra note 5, at 654.
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basis of the preemptive rights doctrine, courts will generally limit the
application of preemptive rights in these circumstances, unless the
charter or bylaws of the corporation expressly indicates that these
rights apply."
So far we have considered situations in which the corporation
had only issued one class of shares. What happens, however, when
there are different classes of outstanding shares? If, for example, the
corporation has common and preferred shares outstanding, and issues
new common stock, do owners of preferred shares have a preemptive
right on the newly issued shares? The M.B.C.A. generally excludes
preemptive rights among different classes of shares." This position is
coherent with case law on the issue.3 5 Some authors have suggested a
more nuanced approach, arguing that preemptive rights should be
granted when the issuing of new shares would have an impact on the
economic or voting rights of a class." This approach is probably pref-
erable, but it is difficult to apply because in many instances it is not
clear when the issuing of new shares affects, at least indirectly, other
classes of shares.
4. Sale of Treasury Shares and Preemptive Rights
A situation similar to the issuing of new shares occurs when
the corporation sells treasury shares. Treasury shares are shares that
the corporation issued to shareholders but later repurchased." The
buy back of own shares raises an issue of equal treatment of share-
holders; if the corporation selectively purchases shares only from some
shareholders, the ones left out might complain that controlling share-
holders or directors abused their power to favor certain sharehold-
ers."3  When the corporation resells the shares, from an economic
standpoint, the situation is similar to the selling of newly issued
shares.
3 See id. at 136, 654.
34 MODEL. Bus. CORP. ACT § 6.30(b)(4), (5).
35 See GEVURTZ supra note 5, at 137. But see Thomas Branch & Co. v. Riverside &
Dan River Cotton Mills, Inc., 123 S.E. 542 (Va. 1924) (recognizing a preemptive
right of preferred shareholders to subscribe newly issued common stock.
36 GEVURTZ supra note 5, at 137.
3 Id.
38 In the famous case of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Company of New England,
Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
held that stockholders in a closely held corporation owe one another the same fidu-
ciary duties as partners in a partnership, and that therefore, if the corporation
buys back shares from a controlling shareholder, then the controlling shareholder
should grant an equal opportunity to minority shareholders to sell their shares at
the same price.
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Once again, the position of existing shareholders might be jeop-
ardized because their voting powers and economic rights might be di-
luted by the sale of shares. Some corporate statutes, in fact, have
extended the common law preemptive rights rule to include sales of
treasury shares." Notwithstanding this similarity, courts have gener-
ally taken the position that preemptive rights do not apply in this case,
unless the articles of incorporation expressly provide for such a
right.40
In Borg v. International Silver Co., the Second Circuit clearly
identified the rationale for excluding preemptive rights for the sale of
treasury stock.4 1 After stating that shareholders have a preemptive
right when new shares are issued, but not in case of sale of treasury
shares, the court opined that:
When a person buys into a company with an authorized
capital, he accepts that proportion of the voting rights
which his purchase bears to the whole. This applies cer-
tainly so far as the other shares are issued at the same
time, and perhaps, also, though they are issued much
later. But treasury shares have by hypothesis once been
issued, and have diluted, as it were, the shareholder's
voting power ab initio. He cannot properly complain that
he is given no right to buy them when they are resold,
because that merely restores the status he originally
accepted.4 2
As the court explains, if shareholders had a preemptive right at the
time the shares were issued, they either exercised it or decided not
to.4 3 If they exercised their rights, they might have resold the shares
to other investors, who in turn sold them to the corporation or might
have sold them back to the corporation. Their preemptive right has
been respected at the time of the issuing and, by selling the shares to
other shareholders or to the corporation, they decided to have a lower
participation in the corporation. On the other hand, if the shareholders
did not exercise their preemptive rights, they accepted the dilution to
their stake in the corporation at the time of the issuing of new shares.
39 An example is § 2.22(C) of the Texas Business Corporation Act, cited by Bittner,
supra note 30, at 911.
40 See GEVURTZ, supra note 5, at 137; Enright v. Heckscher, 240 F. 863, 874 (2d
Cir. 1917); Page v. Smith, 48 Vt. 266 (1876); Crosby v. Stratton, 68 P. 130, 133
(Colo. App. 1902).
4' Borg v. Int'l. Silver Co., 11 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1925).
42 Id. at 151
43 See id.
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In both cases, shareholders have been given the opportunity to main-
tain their percentage of capital and have declined it."
Similarly, shareholders buying shares in a corporation that al-
ready owns treasury shares accept the risk that these shares might be
sold to third parties. In all these cases, shareholders cannot invoke
preferential rights merely because, at a certain time, the shares have
been bought back by the corporation and held as treasury stock. The
only protection that shareholders have, in this case, concerns the pos-
sible damage to the value of their investment if the treasury shares
are sold for less than their actual value. For this reason shareholders
can expect treasury shares to be resold at their fair value, and, if not,
directors might face liability.4 5
It is clear, therefore, that even when shareholders have a pre-
emptive right (either a statutory one, as it was in the past, or because
of a charter provision, as it might be today), that right does not extend
to the sale of treasury stock." Obviously this conclusion also holds
when shareholders do not have a preemptive right in the first place.
5. Directors' Fiduciary Duties and Other Limitations to the Sale of
New Shares
A delicate issue that might arise is whether directors are al-
lowed to freely sell shares only to some shareholders, therefore alter-
ing the balance of power within the corporation. In general terms we
have seen that when preemptive rights do not apply, directors can sell
new shares (or treasury shares) as they see fit. This freedom is, how-
ever, not unlimited.4 7 Consider, for example, a situation where the
charter of the corporation provides for a supermajority of two-thirds of
the votes to approve certain extraordinary transactions, such as a
merger. One shareholder owns 60% of the outstanding shares, and an-
other one owns 40%. Can the directors sell shares only to the first
shareholder, thus bringing his participation above the 66.6% threshold
and giving him absolute control over those transactions? In this case,
the solution should not be found in preemptive rights, but rather in
directors' fiduciary duties and in the principle of equal treatment of
shareholders.
As mentioned above, directors' fiduciary duties are a powerful
and flexible instrument to limit directors' discretion in issuing shares.
Whenever directors have a conflict of interest, the general rule is that
either the transaction is approved by disinterested directors or share-
holders, or that it is entirely fair to the corporation. The simplest case
44 See id.
4 See id. at 152.
46 See GEVURTZ, supra note 5, at 137.
47 See generally id. at 273.
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occurs if directors issue shares to themselves or their affiliates at a
bargain price.4 8 In this case there is a clear conflict of interest, and the
transaction is not fair. To go forward, it would require the approval of
disinterested parties.4 9 However, the situation can often be trickier.
A first problem occurs when directors issue shares to them-
selves at a fair price. In this case, the effect of the issuing could be a
shift in control, but the rule applicable to conflicted transactions would
not be very helpful because the transaction is fair to the corporation
(the price is adequate) and is only unfair to diluted shareholders.so In
this scenario, some courts have taken the position that directors must
demonstrate a corporate purpose for the selective sale.51 A second case
deserving consideration occurs when directors offer new shares to all
shareholders at a bargain price, but some shareholders do not have the
financial resources or the willingness to buy additional shares. Direc-
tors might exploit the lack of financial means of one or more share-
holders to dilute their participation, claiming that formally all
shareholders had an equal opportunity to buy the discounted shares.5 2
Also, in this instance, some courts have required a business purpose
for the bargain sale of the shares.
The situation is more complicated when directors want to favor
a particular shareholder with whom they have no formal affiliation,
for example, because they expect that the shareholder will continue to
retain them on the board of directors. To do so, they might selectively
sell new shares only to this shareholder at a fair price, thus determin-
ing a shift in control or in any case diluting the voting power of other
shareholders.5 4
In this scenario the first issue would be one of fact, demonstrat-
ing that there is a conflict of interest. The rules governing conflicted
transactions, however, might not be sufficient to protect shareholders
because the sale is fair to the corporation. The best solution would be
to require a business purpose for the transaction, arguing that in the
absence of such a purpose, shareholders should be treated equally.
48 Id. at 138.
4 Id.
5o See id. at 138-39.
s Schwartz v. Marien, 335 N.E.2d 334 (N.Y. 1975). But see Tallant v. Executive
Equities, Inc., 209 S.E.2d 159 (Ga. 1974) for an example of a case in which the
court has not required a showing of business purpose. The case is illustrated by
GEVURTZ, supra note 5, at 138.
52 See GEVURTZ, supra note 5, at 138.
5 Id. at 138-39 (citing Katzowitz v. Sidler, 24 N.Y.2d 512, 301 N.Y.S.2d 470, 29
N.E.2d 359 (1969) as a case in point).
54 id.
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PART II: EUROPEAN LAW
1. The European Framework: The Second Company Law Directive
The Second Company Law Directive, enacted in 1977 and
amended several times,5 5 sets forth a harmonized regulation of the for-
mation of corporations, focusing in particular on legal capital and its
maintenance and alteration. Its breadth spans from the minimum
amount of capital to eligible contributions and from purchasing of
owned shares to distributions to shareholders. For the purposes of this
essay the relevant provisions are contained in Articles 25, applicable
to publicly held corporations.5 6 Two key principles need to be empha-
sized here. First, Article 25, Paragraph 1, provides that any increase
in capital must be decided upon by the general shareholders' meet-
ing.5 Second, Article 29 establishes that when the capital is increased
and the new shares are paid in cash, the shares must be offered on a
preemptive basis to shareholders in proportion to the capital repre-
sented by their shares.5 1
These two provisions establish a minimum level of harmoniza-
tion that is very different from, and arguably opposite of, the American
regulatory model. The European approach gives more powers to the
shareholders' meeting in deciding the issuing of new shares, and man-
dates preemptive rights as a general rule when shares are issued for a
consideration in cash.
To get a clearer sense of how the general provisions of the Sec-
ond Company Law Directive have been implemented in some Member
States, it is helpful to examine some specific European jurisdictions.
2. Italian Law: Regulation of Issuing of New Shares for
a Consideration
The Italian system offers an excellent example of the way in
which the regulation of issuing new shares adopted in continental Eu-
rope compares with U.S. law. In fact, as we will discuss, the Italian
Civil Code (I.C.C.) follows an approach that is considered opposite to
the American one, characterized by mandatory regulation that leaves
little room for freedom of contract and directors' discretion." Under
5s Second Council Directive, Dec. 13, 1976, 1977 O.J. (L 026) 1 [hereinafter Second
Council Directive] (updated by Directive 2006/68/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 6 September 2006, 2006 O.J. (L 264) 32 and Directive 2009/
109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009, 2009
O.J. (L 259)14).
56 See Second Council Directive, supra note 55, art. 25.
5 Id. art. 25 para. 1.
58 Id. art. 29.
5 See generally CODICE CIVILE [C.C.] (It.).
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Italian law, the interests of existing shareholders receive a stronger
protection vis-&-vis the interest of the corporation to maintain a flexi-
ble financial structure so as not to be diluted through a capital
increase.
In addition, in light of the partially harmonized regulation at
the European level, the Italian system has important similarities with
the systems of other major continental European jurisdictions, there-
fore presenting a good illustration of the European regulatory model.
For these reasons, the following pages concentrate on the Italian sys-
tem first and then briefly examine other European countries, such as
Germany, France, Spain, and the U.K.
A first crucial difference between the Italian and American reg-
ulation and practice of issuing new shares concerns the competence to
decide the increase of capital. Under Italian law, pursuant to the Sec-
ond Company Law Directive, the power is primarily in the hands of
the shareholders. 0 The issuing of new shares for a consideration, in
fact, represents an amendment to the corporate charter that can only
be approved by the so-called "extraordinary" shareholders' meeting
with a supermajority.6 1 The matter can be delegated to directors by
the shareholders' meeting, pursuant to Article 2443 of the I.C.C.6 2 In
this case, the situation is similar to the one in which a U.S. corporation
has authorized but unissued shares. The delegation to directors, how-
ever, can only be given for a maximum period of five years, therefore
limiting directors' freedom to issue new shares.6 3
Probably the most crucial difference concerns preemptive
rights. In contrast to the U.S.-or, more precisely, in contrast to cur-
rent U.S. rules, but similar to the traditional U.S. approach-the stat-
utory and mandatory rule generally applicable is that, in any issuing
of new shares for a consideration, all shareholders have a preemptive
right to purchase the new shares proportionally to their stake in the
corporation. 6 4 Another difference with U.S. law is that, in a closely-
held corporation, the shareholders that exercise their preemptive right
do not only have the right to buy the new shares pro rata, but they can
also exercise an additional preemptive right on the shares that other
shareholders have not bought.6 5 Hence, if a corporation has two
shareholders and only one of them exercises her preemptive right, she
has the right to also buy the percentage of shares that the other share-
60 See Second Council Directive, supra note 55.
61 See CODICE CIVILE [C.C.] (It.).
62 CODICE CIVILE [C.c.] art. 2443 (It.).
63 See GIUSEPPE A.M. TRniMARcin, L'AUMENTO DEL CAPITAL SOCIALE 337 (Iposa,
2007) (It.).
6 CODICE CIVILE [C.c.] art. 2441, para. 1 (It.).
65 Id. para. 3.
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holder refused, increasing her percentage of the corporation's capi-
tal.6 6 Only if shareholders do not exercise this additional right of
preference can directors sell the shares to third parties.
The scope of the preemptive right under Italian law is also
broader with respect to the securities to which the right attaches.
First, the law expressly states that the holders of bonds convertible
into shares also enjoy preemptive rights and that preemptive rights
can also be exercised on convertible bonds, when issued.6 ' The ratio-
nale for this rule is straightforward: since holders of bonds convertible
into shares can potentially become shareholders, not granting preemp-
tive rights to or on these financial instruments would allow a dilution
of the position of shareholders or bondholders. It should be noted, how-
ever, that according to a recent case involving Spain, the European
Court of Justice has taken the position that granting preemptive
rights to holders of convertible bonds is against European law, as it
reduces the number of shares available to shareholders.6 8
The law is not similarly clear with respect to preemptive rights
when it comes to issuing different classes of shares. There is a specific
rule for non-voting shares issued by listed corporations: Article 145 of
the Consolidated Law on Finance." This rule provides that, in the ab-
sence of a different option in the corporate charter, holders of non-vot-
ing shares have a preemptive right on shares of the same class.o If
non-voting shares are not issued, holders of these shares have a pre-
emptive right on the classes of shares that are issued. Most commenta-
tors have expressed the view that this rule is the expression of a more
general principle, where preemptive rights include the right to sub-
scribe to shares of different categories if the capital increase does not
respect the proportion between the categories of shares already
outstanding.7 1
66 But see supra, Part I.
67 CODICE CILE [C.c.] art. 2441, para. 1 (It.).
68 The European Court of Justice, in Case C-338/06, Commission of the European
Communities v. Kingdom of Spain, held that Article 29 of the Second Directive
gives to shareholders priority over all other potential purchasers of new shares
and convertible bonds. It follows, according to the court, that Spanish law, which
gives preemptive rights to convertible bondholders, might jeopardize shareholders'
preemptive rights. In this case, the Kingdom of Spain, which has a provision simi-
lar to the Italian one cited, was considered not having fulfilled its obligations
under the Second Directive.
69 Legislative Decree No. 58 of 24 February 1998 Consolidated Law on Finance,
art. 145 (1998) (It.).
70 See id.
71 See generally G.F. CAMPOBASSO, DIRITTO CONHlfERICALE: DIRTrO DELLE SOCIETA
521, n. 44 (ed. M. Campobasso) (Utet, 2012) (It.).
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3. Statutory Limitations to Preemptive Rights
Preemptive rights can be limited or excluded only in four spe-
cific and narrow circumstances, listed in Article 2441 I.C.. 7 2 The first
circumstance applies when the resolution approving the capital in-
crease provides that the consideration for the new shares must be a
contribution in kind." The rationale is the same as that adopted by
U.S. courts to limit contractual preemptive rights included in the cor-
porate charter in the absence of a specific provision: the interest of the
corporation to receive exactly the property it seeks to acquire trumps
the interest of shareholders not to be diluted. The law suggests, how-
ever, that, even in this case, it is not sufficient that the resolution indi-
cates a contribution in kind, but also that a specific business purpose
for the contribution in kind be shown in order to not elude the right of
shareholders to maintain their stake in the corporation.7 4
The second case in which preemptive rights do not apply is,
pursuant to Article 2441, Paragraph 5 of the I.C.C., where "the inter-
est of the corporation requires it."" The scope of this provision is
clearly broader and more blurred, but a few examples can be derived
from corporate practice. When a corporation is going public, it needs to
have a minimum number of shareholders in order to be admitted to a
stock exchange. The initial public offer must, therefore, be made to a
broad range of investors, and preemptive rights would be an insur-
mountable obstacle to the creation of a widespread ownership struc-
ture." In this case, the interest of the corporation to be listed
arguably requires that preemptive rights be limited. This may occur,
for example, when a corporation wants to attract a new shareholder in
order to become part of a corporate group, or to exploit the business
relationships and expertise of the new shareholder.
Similar to the U.S. model, a third possible exclusion of preemp-
tive rights can be based on an intention to compensate employees with
shares of the corporation. Pursuant to Article 2441, Paragraph 8 of
the I.C.C., when new shares are offered to employees, a maximum of
one-fourth of the new shares can be sold without granting existing
shareholders a preemptive right." It should be noted, however, that
the limitation on preemptive rights can only affect 25% of the newly
issued shares in order to curb the possible dilution of existing
shareholders."
72 CODICE CIVILE [C.c.] art. 2441 (It.).
7 CODICE CIVILE [C.c.] art. 2441, para. 4 (It.).
74 See TRiMARCHI supra note 63, at 323 n. 259.
7s CODICE CIVILE [C.c.] art. 2441, para. 5. (It.)
76 See generally GEVURTZ, supra note 5.
" CODICE CIVILE [C.c.] art. 2441, para. 8 (It.).
78 Id.
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The fourth and last situation in which preemptive rights can be
limited applies only to listed corporations. This is a relatively recent
innovation introduced in 2003 and inspired by German law.79 Article
2441, Paragraph 4 of the I.C.C. provides that the charter of a listed
corporation can opt for the possibility of increasing the amount of out-
standing shares up to 10% of their number without granting preemp-
tive rights. 0 The rationale of this rule is to give more flexibility to
listed corporations in designing their financial structure by allowing
the issuing and selling of new shares without the time-consuming offer
to existing shareholders required by preemptive rights. In a listed cor-
poration, when shares are traded on a liquid regulated market, the
risk of shareholders' dilution is more limited: existing shareholders
that want to maintain their position in the corporation can, in fact,
easily buy additional shares on the market.
As mentioned above, these four exceptions to mandatory pre-
emptive rights are the only ones allowed: contribution in kind, interest
of the corporation, shares offered to employees, and 10% of the out-
standing shares in listed corporations." Only in these cases can the
stake of a shareholder in the corporation be diluted if the shareholders'
meeting so decides. The law, however, provides for specific rules con-
cerning the issuing price of the new shares in case of limitation or ex-
clusion of preemptive rights, in order to avoid an economic damage to
investors. The selling price of the shares cannot, in these cases, be
lower than a fair price determined through specific procedures.
More precisely, in the first three cases listed above, the direc-
tors must present the shareholders with a proposal indicating the issu-
ing price calculated on the basis of the actual value of the corporation,
taking into account, in the case of listed shares, their market price in
the last six months.8 2 The proposal also must be shared with the audi-
tors of the corporation, who must issue an opinion on the fairness of
the issuing price." In the last case where preemptive rights can be
limited, concerning 10% of the outstanding shares in listed corpora-
tions, the issuing price must be equal to the "market value" of the
shares, and the auditing firm must confirm this equivalence.8 4
In the four cases when preemptive rights can be excluded, di-
rectors are not free to issue the new shares to one or some of the ex-
7 See Gaia Balp & Marco Ventoruzzo, Esclusione del diritto d'opzione nelle societel
con azioni quotate nei limiti del dieci per cento del capitale e determinazione del
prezzo di emissione, 49 RIVISTA DELLE SOCIETA 795 (2004) (It.).
80 CODICE CIVILE [C.c.] art. 2441, para. 4 (It.).
81 See generally id. art. 2441.
82 See id. art. 2441, para. 6.
83 See id.
84 See id. para. 4.
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isting shareholders, thus increasing their participation in the
corporation. On the one hand, the statutory language relating to the
circumstances under which preemptive rights can be excluded limits
the ability of directors to sell the shares only to some shareholders.
Consider the case of contributions in kind. Only if a business purpose
justifies the acquisition of property owned by a specific shareholder
can the new shares be sold only to this investor. The same is true in
the few cases in which the interest of the corporation requires the ex-
clusion of preemptive rights, or when preemptive rights are excluded
for the benefit of employees.
In addition, general corporate law principles require equal
treatment of all shareholders. 8 5 Pursuant to this principle, it is diffi-
cult to justify the exclusion of preemptive rights and the simultaneous
sale of shares to a selected number of shareholders, leaving the other
ones out in the cold.
Also under Italian law, as in the U.S., there are no preemptive
rights in the case of merger. Unlike the U.S., however, Italian law,
pursuant to European law, does not allow cash-out mergers. As a con-
sequence, generally all shareholders of the corporations involved re-
ceive a proportionally identical percentage of shares in the corporation
resulting from the merger, calculated on the basis of the exchange
ratio.8 6
Finally, in Italy there are no specific rules concerning the re-
sale by the corporation of treasury shares, which in theory, could be
sold to only some shareholders. This practice would however be subject
to scrutiny based on the above-mentioned principle of equal treatment
of shareholders.
In this section we have considered how shareholders are pro-
tected against possible dilutions caused by the issuing of new shares
under Italian law. To sum up, we have seen that Italian law, in com-
parison to U.S. law, provides for more rigid rules against dilutions.
First, the competence to issue new shares for a consideration is more
firmly in the hands of the shareholders. Second, all shareholders have
a mandatory preemptive right established in the corporate statute-a
8 A general principle of equal treatment of shareholders under European com-
pany law has also been inferred by the European Court of Justice in the "Audi-
olux" case. See Federico M. Mucciarelli, Equal Treatment of Shareholders and
European Union Law, 7 Eun. Co. & FIN. L. REV. 158 (2010). For a study of the
principal of equal treatment of shareholders in Italy, see generally Carlo Angelici,
Paritd di trattamento degli azionisti, RIVISTA DI Dnmirro COMMERCIALE 1 (1987)
(It.). In specifically listed corporations, see Marco Ventoruzzo, Article 92. Parithl di
trattamento, in LA DISCIPLINA DELLE SOCIETA QUOTATE (Vol. I, Giuffr6, 1999) (Pier-
gaetano Marchetti &Luigi A. Bianchi eds.).
86 See Marco Ventoruzzo, Freeze-outs: Transcontinental Analysis and Reform Pro-
posals, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 841, 887 (2010).
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right that can be waived only in narrow circumstances. If the rights
are waived, mandatory rules ensure that the issuing price is fair and
specifically, not lower than the actual value of the shares.
4. Italian Law: Directors' Fiduciary Duties
Directors can be liable to the corporation or to a single share-
holder for a violation of their duty of care and loyalty, which include
the duty to act lawfully." A violation of the mandatory rules concern-
ing the procedures required for issuing new shares can therefore result
in liability to the corporation and to single shareholders. Liability to
the corporation occurs when the corporation suffers the damage, and
shareholders can also act derivatively on behalf of the corporation.
When the damage only affects shareholders and does not implicate
damage to corporate assets, shareholders also have a direct cause of
action against directors.
Not respecting the rules concerning preemptive rights can be a
source of liability in at least two circumstances. For one, illegally ex-
cluding preemptive rights can damage shareholders by diluting their
investment. Additionally, setting an issuing price below the fair value
in the cases in which the preemptive right is excluded can damage
both the corporation (which receives less than the actual value of the
shares), and the shareholders (whose participation loses value).
This type of lawsuit is fairly rare, for at least two reasons.
First, the procedure to issue new shares is tightly regulated, as are the
cases in which the preemptive right can be limited. This regulatory
approach leaves little room for directors' discretion. To incur liability,
directors would have to blatantly disregard the law by, for example,
denying preemptive rights when shareholders are entitled to them. In
other words, director liability arises more easily when directors have
more freedom to act, and a breach of the duty of care or of loyalty is
possible; there is a direct relationship between discretion and account-
ability. When mandatory provisions govern an area of the law, viola-
tions of fiduciary duties tend to be more rare.
There is a second and more general reason why directors' fidu-
ciary duties do not play the same role in Italy that they play in the
U.S. The Italian system relies less on private litigation as an ex post
mechanism to govern corporations, for a number of reasons, including
procedural ones. The absence of a U.S. style class action and of discov-
ery, the existence of a "loser pays" rule, the unavailability of contin-
gency fees to retain lawyers, and the extremely long duration of civil
8 For an overview of the concept of directors' fiduciary duties in Europe, see gen-
erally Holger Fleischer, Legal Transplants in European Company Law-The Case
of Fiduciary Duties, 2 Eun. COMPANY AND FIN. L. REv. 378 (2005).
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litigation contribute to reduce the attractiveness of litigation as a
means to protect preemptive rights of disgruntled shareholders."
5. Germany
Pursuant to the Second Company Law Directive under German
law, an increase of capital for consideration must be decided by the
shareholders' meeting and represents an amendment to the corpora-
tion's charter. There is a double majority requirement, because the
resolution must be approved by a simple majority of the votes, repre-
senting at least three-quarters of the voting capital." The corporate
charter or bylaws can increase these percentages to further protect
shareholders.o In addition, if the corporation has issued different
classes of shares, any capital increase affecting the rights of a class of
shares must also be approved by a class vote.91
Shareholders can delegate the power to increase the capital to
directors generally, or for specific purposes.9 2 In the former case, the
delegation can be given only for a maximum period of five years, simi-
lar to Italian law, and the capital increase cannot exceed 50% of the
outstanding shares." Rules concerning preemptive rights in Germany
(Bezugsrecht) are particularly rigid. Generally, shareholders always
have a mandatory preemptive right, both when the new shares are
issued for cash and when issued for assets in kind.94 Shareholders
may waive their preemptive rights, but only through a resolution,
voted on by three-quarters of the capital represented at the meeting
and based on a report prepared by the executive board (Vorstand),
stating the reasons why the exclusion of preemptive rights is in the
company's best interest. 5 Courts also require managers to show that
the corporation has a valid business purpose to limit preemptive
8 For an excellent and recent analysis of these procedural elements, and an ex-
planation of why they can limit the use of corporate litigation in European coun-
tries, including Italy, see Martin Gelter, Why Do Shareholders Derivative Suits
Remain Rare in Continental Europe?, 37 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 843 (2012).
89 Aktiengesetz [AKTG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sep. 6, 1965, BGBL. I at 1089,
§ 182 (1) (Ger.), translated in STOCK CORPORATION ACT, NORTON ROSE (1 Dec.
2011) [hereinafter Stock Corporation Act]; see also CAHN & DONALD supra note 3,
at 197; see generally GERHARD WIRTH ET AL., CORPORATE LAW IN GERMANY 179
(C.H. Beck, 2nd ed., 2010).
90 See Stock Corporation Act, supra note 89, at 1089, § 182 (1) (Ger.), translated in
STOCK CORPORATION ACT, NORTON ROSE (1 Dec. 2011).
91 Stock Corporation Act, supra note 89, § 182 (2).
92 Id. §§202; 186.
93 CAHN & DONALD, supra note 3, at 198.
94 See Stock Corporation Act, supra note 89, at 1089, § 186(1) (Ger.), translated in
STOCK CORPORATION ACT, NORTON ROSE (1 Dec. 2011).
9 Id. § 186(3)-(4).
2013] ISSUING NEW SHARES AND PREEMPTIVE RIGHTS
rights." When preemptive rights are waived, the issuing price of the
new shares must be appropriate, and shareholders have an explicit
cause of action to challenge the price in court.
In the 1990s, the German corporate statute was amended to
allow the exclusion of preemptive rights in listed corporations if the
new shares are paid in cash." In this case, the capital increase cannot
exceed 10% of the outstanding shares, and the issuing price cannot be
lower than the market price." This ground for limiting preemptive
rights is, as previously discussed, similar to one of the four grounds for
exclusion under Italian law.100
6. France
Under French law, issuing new shares for a consideration is
subject to specific formalities designed to protect shareholders against
the risk of dilution. The power to decide the capital increase is, as in
other European jurisdictions, in the hands of the so-called extraordi-
nary shareholders' meeting and is subject to supermajority require-
ments (two thirds of the votes cast).o The shareholders can, however,
delegate the power to the directors pursuant to Article L. 225-129 of
the Commercial Code and, in listed companies, the delegation can also
be given to the CEO. 1 0 2
When France introduced mandatory preemptive rights in
1935,03 the legislature allowed preemptive rights to be waived by the
96 See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 13, 1978, II ZR
142/76 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 71
(40) (Ger.); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 19, 1982, II
ZR 55/81 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ]
83 (319) (Ger.); CAHN & DONALD, supra note 3, at 201-02; see also HERIBERT
HIRTE, BEZUGSRECHTSAUSSCHLUSS UND KONZERNBILDUNG 58 ff. (Heyman, 1986).
9 Stock Corporation Act, supra note 89, at 1089, § 255(2)-(3) (Ger.), translated in
STOCK CORPORATION ACT, NORTON ROSE (1 Dec. 2011). Veil, in Schmidt and Lutter
(2008: § 182 mn. 23).
98 Id. § 186(3).
9 Id. § 255(2)-(3).
100 WIRTH ET AL., supra note 89, at 179.
101 MAURICE COZIAN ET. AL, DROIT DES SOCIETEs 457 (LexisNexis, 25th ed., 2012)
(Fr.).
102 CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] art. L.225-129-1 (Fr.); see also id. n. 61.
103 See Fr6d6ric Serpoul, Beyond Legal Origins: Shareholder Protection and Stock
Market Development in France (1852-2007) 19 (London School of Economics and
Political Science, Working Paper, June 15, 2013) ("Shareholder rights improved
significantly in the mid-1930's through changes intiatied by the Laval government
[...]. In particular, as a result of the 1935 laws which granted preemptive rights
to shareholders in order to prevent majority shareholders abuses (dilution), LLSV
shareholder right index rose to 2.").
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shareholders' meeting, not dissimilarly from what was happening in
some U.S. States. 1 0 4 France still provides for mandatory preemptive
rights in Article L. 225-132 of the Commercial Code.105 The extraordi-
nary shareholders' meeting can, however, waive preemptive rights. In
this case, the resolution must indicate the persons that will subscribe
to the shares, or the criteria that the subscribers must meet. 10 6 In
listed corporations, the indication of the beneficiary of the shares is not
necessary. 10 7 Also in listed corporations, the Commercial Code pro-
vides that when preemptive rights are waived the shareholders' meet-
ing can give existing shareholders a term during which they can
subscribe the shares before third parties. 1 s Preemptive rights also do
not apply when the extraordinary shareholders' meeting approves an
increase of capital paid with consideration in kind.109 It can be ob-
served, therefore, that France also views preemptive rights as the de-
fault rule, and that preemptive rights can only be waived with the
consent of the controlling shareholders.
Specific rules apply to the determination of the issuing price
when preemptive rights are waived. The general rule, applicable when
the shareholders' decision indicates the beneficiaries acquiring the
new shares, is that the price can be determined by the shareholders'
meeting.110 In listed corporations, when the beneficiaries of the new
shares are not indicated, the price must be in line with the trading
price in order to avoid a prejudice to the value of the existing share-
holders' shares."n
7. Spain
Under the Spanish Ley de Sociedades de Capital, the compe-
tence to increase the capital is primarily in the hands of the sharehold-
ers' meeting. The shareholders can, however, delegate this power to
the board of directors for a period of five years, although in this case
the amount of the increase is limited to fifty percent of the outstanding
capital.1 12
104 Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country
Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 791, 825 (2002).
105 Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United States
and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 697, 729
(2005).
106 CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] art. L.225-138 (Fr.).
107 MAURICE COZIAN ET. AL., supra note 101, at 459.
108 CODE DE COMMERCE [C. coM.] art. L.225-135-5 (Fr.); MAURICE COZIAN ET AL.,
supra note 101, at 459.
109 MAURICE COZIAN ET AL., supra note 101, at 462.
110 CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] art. L.225-138 (Fr.).
111 See CODE DE COMMERCE [C. coM.] art. L.225-136 (Fr.).
112 Corporations Act art. 297 (B.O.E. 2010, 161) (Spain).
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As a general rule, when new shares are issued, existing share-
holders have a preemptive right (derecho de preferentia). After a 2008
decision of the European Court of Justice, bondholders no longer have
preemptive rights when new shares are issued.1 13 This right can be
totally or partially waived by the shareholders when the interest of the
corporation requires it. In this case, the directors must prepare a re-
port to the shareholders indicating the value of the shares, the reasons
for the exclusion of the preemptive right, and the investors that will
subscribe the new shares. An independent appraiser appointed by the
Office of the Corporate Register must calculate the value of the shares
and of the preemptive rights that are excluded, and must assess the
soundness of the value of the shares included in the directors' report.
The issuing price cannot be lower than the fair value of the shares.1 1 4
8. United Kingdom
In the U.K., pursuant to European law, directors may issue
new shares only if authorized by the corporate charter or by the share-
holders; the authorization must specify the maximum number of
shares that can be issued and can only be given for a period of five
years." 5 U.K. law gives, however, more extensive powers to directors
in the case of a close company with only one class of shares. In this
case, the directors are free to issue new shares unless there is an ex-
plicit prohibition in the articles of incorporation.1"'
The English corporate law statute introduced preemptive
rights (also called "rights issue") to comply with European Union
law." 7 The relevant provisions can be found in the Companies Act,
Part 17, Chapter 3, § 560.118 It is interesting to point out that, differ-
ent from the U.S. and even other European systems, preemptive rights
also apply in the case of a sale of treasury shares held by the
company.'1 9
U.K. law distinguishes between exceptions, exclusions, and dis-
application of preemptive rights. Exceptions include the case in which
shares are paid other than in cash 2 0 and when the shares are des-
11 The European Court of Justice declared this provision in violation of the Sec-
ond Directive because granting preemptive rights to convertible bondholders lim-
its the number of shares available for shareholders, contrary to the provision of
the Directive; see Case C-338/06 supra note 68.
114 MANUEL BROSETA PONT & FERNANDO MARTINEZ SANZ, MANUAL DE DERECHO
MERCANTIL 460 (19th ed., 2012) (Sp.).
115 Companies Act, 2006, c. 2, §551 (U.K.).
116 BRENDA HANNIGAN, COMPANY LAW 460 (3d ed. 2012).
117 Pistor et al., supra note 104, at 825.
118 Companies Act, 2006, c. 3, § 560 (U.K.).
119 Id. § 573.
120 Id. § 565.
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tined to an employees' share scheme.121 The articles of incorporation of
a close corporation can exclude preemptive rights pursuant to § 567 of
the Companies Act, which provides an opt-out mechanism. In addi-
tion, the directors of a private company that has only one class of
shares outstanding can be given, by the articles of incorporation or by
the shareholders, the power not to apply preemptive rights. 1 2 2
PART III: CONCLUSIONS
This overview of the rules governing issuing of new shares in
the U.S. and in some European jurisdictions has shown a few basic,
but important, comparative differences. In the U.S., within the limit of
authorized shares, directors have significant freedom to increase capi-
tal. This freedom is enhanced by the practice of authorizing a number
of shares significantly higher than the number of outstanding shares,
but is partially curbed by rules requiring shareholders' approval when
the issuing of new shares might determine a shift in control. In terms
of competence, the differences with European jurisdictions are not par-
ticularly profound.
It is true that, in Europe, the competence to issue new shares is
generally attributed to the shareholders' meeting, while in the U.S.,
the powers of directors are original and undelegated.1 2 3 However, it is
also true that in Europe shareholders can delegate their power to issue
new shares to directors, even if there are some limitations to this
power, such as the fact that the delegation is only valid for five years.
Through a delegation, therefore, European directors can also be en-
trusted with a meaningful degree of freedom in issuing new shares.
The real and profound difference concerns preemptive rights.
Generally speaking, most American statutes, including the M.B.C.A.
and Delaware law, do not provide for preemptive rights. These rights
are only available through a specific option in the articles of incorpora-
tion, and virtually no listed corporations make such an option. Share-
holders are protected against the risk of unfair dilution primarily
through directors' fiduciary duties. In Europe, as the Italian example
clearly shows, shareholders' preemptive rights are mandatory and can
only be waived in limited circumstances when the interest of the corpo-
ration requires it. When shareholders waive their preemptive rights,
the issuing price generally cannot be lower than the fair market value
of the shares. Comparatively, directors' fiduciary duties play a more
limited role in protecting shareholders.
What does this difference tells us about the forces that shape
corporate law on the two sides of the Atlantic? How does this compari-
121 See id. § 566.
122 Id. § 569.
123 See Manson v. Curtis, 119 N.E. 559, 562 (N.Y. 1918).
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son reflect on the structure of corporate law? It is tempting to charac-
terize the European approach, and the Italian approach in particular,
as more regressive when compared to its U.S. counterpart. After all,
with some differences, the U.S. adopted mandatory preemptive rights
in the past but abandoned them in favor of a more flexible rule that
allows corporations, and their directors, to follow a more expeditious
and efficient procedure to sell new shares. To simply dismiss the Euro-
pean approach as a relic of the past would not, however, be a satisfac-
tory conclusion.
A second and more compelling explanation of the diverging ap-
proaches might be based on the degree of separation between owner-
ship and control. In the U.S., at an earlier stage, the separation
between ownership and control became more profound, resulting in
managers and directors becoming key players in shaping corporate
laws. Directors and managers, selecting the state of incorporation, can
put pressure on the legislatures to adopt the rules that they favor.
This was probably one of the driving forces that induced state legisla-
tures to abolish mandatory preemptive rights.1 2 4
In Europe the situation is radically different. Notwithstanding
the recent developments of the jurisprudence of the European Court of
Justice,1 2 5 in Europe there is not, and probably never will be, a market
for corporate charters as developed as the American one. In addition,
prevailing ownership structures are profoundly different from the U.S.
In most continental systems, controlling shareholders are still very in-
fluential both within the corporation and vis-&-vis policy makers. In
the U.K., while ownership structures of public corporations are more
124 John Armour and David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Take-
overs, and Why? - The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation,
95 GEO. L. J. 1727 (2007) advances a fascinating public choice explanation for the
differences in takeover regulation in the U.K. and in the U.S. The former system
seems to favor managers and directors against hostile acquisitions, while the lat-
ter favors institutional investors through the use of the mandatory tender offer
rule and the passivity rule. In short, they advocate that this difference can be
explained in the light of the influence of institutional investors on the development
of U.K. rules, and of directors and managers in the U.S. A similar argument could
be used for the regulation of preemptive rights: in the U.S., stronger managers and
directors managed to shift the regulatory approach to greater flexibility in the is-
suance of new shares, while in Europe institutional investors and controlling
shareholders pushed for a stronger protection of their investment through
mandatory preemptive rights.
125 See Marco Ventoruzzo, "Cost-based" and "Rules-based" Regulatory Competi-
tion: Markets for Corporate Charters in the U.S. and in the E.U., 3 N.Y.U. J.L. &
Bus. 91, 133-35 (2006); Veronika Korom & Peter Metzinger, Freedom of Establish-
ment for Companies: The European Court of Justice Confirms and Refines its Daily
Mail Decision in the Cartesio Case C-210/06, 6 EUR. CoMPANY AND FIN. L. REV.
125 (2009).
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widespread than in continental Europe, institutional investors are
particularly strong. As a result, it is more difficult for directors and
managers to obtain a legislative departure from preemptive rights
that protect the interests of existing shareholders. The Second Direc-
tive and the regulatory approaches of the Member States reflect this
situation: mandatory preemptive rights are still considered a corner-
stone of corporate law, and shareholders play a more crucial role in
controlling the issuing of new shares.
The explanation based on ownership structure is not com-
pletely satisfactory. It might be argued that in listed or publicly held
corporations, where the separation between ownership and control is
more profound in the U.S., directors and managers influenced the de-
velopment of corporate law toward the abolition of mandatory preemp-
tive rights. But the shift in the U.S. also affected close corporations, in
which the degree of separation between ownership and control is
lower. Also in these corporations, as we have seen, directors have
broader, non-delegable powers to issue new shares, and preemptive
rights are generally not available unless the governing documents of
the corporation provide for them. The prevailing ownership structures
of the firms do not, therefore, seem to fully capture the reasons that
led the U.S. to substantially abolish mandatory preemptive rights in
all types of corporations.
An alternative theory might be that the diverging development
of U.S. and European laws on preemptive rights reflects a more gen-
eral "cultural" difference concerning the function of corporate law. In
the U.S., shareholders are considered investors able to contract the ba-
sic rules of the corporate contract among themselves and with other
corporate actors. From this point of view, it makes sense to provide for
preemptive rights only on an optional basis. Freedom of contract is
considered a sufficient protection for shareholders, as they are able to
maximize efficiency. If shareholders want preemptive rights, they will
include them in the charter of the corporation.
In Europe, by contrast, there is not a similar trust in the vir-
tues of contractual liberty: property rights of shareholders are more
strongly protected through mandatory rules, at the expense of a more
flexible financial structure that would allow directors and managers to
obtain fresh financial resources from new investors more quickly. The
greater discretion of directors in the U.S. is balanced in this area, by
the policing role of litigation for breaches of fiduciary duties, while liti-
gation in Europe plays a lesser role.
